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THE CHENEY DILEMMA: SHOULD A DEFENDANT
BE ALLOWED TO APPEAL THE FACTUAL BASIS OF
HIS CONVICTION AFTER ENTERING AN
UNCONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA?
Kristen N. Sinisi+
Described as both "the single most important (and powerful) factor in the
disposition of criminal cases'' and also "an essential component of the
administration of justice,",2 it should come as no surprise that the plea-
bargaining3 process has secured a central role in the American justice system.
After all, the federal justice system annually disposes of an estimated ninety-
five percent4 of all criminal cases through guilty pleas. 5  Because of the
prevalence of guilty pleas, and to encourage their continued use, procedural
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2011, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2008, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, Robert E. Cook Honors College. The author
would like to extend her gratitude to Assistant United States Attorney Deborah Connor for her
expertise and invaluable guidance during the writing process. The author also wishes to express
her deepest appreciation to her parents, David and Dawna, and her grandparents, John and Nelda,
for their endless love, encouragement, and support.
1. Milton Heumann, Back to the Future: The Centrality of Plea Bargaining in the Criminal
Justice System, 18 CAN. J.L. & SOC'Y 133, 133 (2003) (discussing Professor George Fisher's
view of plea bargaining).
2. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
3. A "plea bargain" is "[a] negotiated agreement between a prosecutor and a criminal
defendant whereby the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offense or to one of multiple charges in
exchange for some concession by the prosecutor, [usually] a more lenient sentence or a dismissal
of the other charges." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1270 (9th ed. 2009).
4. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF 2004 tbl.4.2 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cfjs04.pdf (noting that approximately ninety-six percent of the defendants found guilty of
criminal offenses in federal courts in 2004 entered guilty pleas); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2006 tbl.4.2 (2009), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2006/fjs06st.pdf [hereinafter 2006 STATISTICS]
(noting that 76,300 (95.49%) of 79,904 federal criminal convictions in fiscal year 2006 were
attributable to guilty pleas); see also MARCH MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2005 tbl.7 (2008), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs05.pdf (noting that in 2005, only 3.9% of federal
criminal convictions were returned by juries or from bench trials); The Plea Bargaining Blog,
http://thepleabargainingblog.blogspot.com/ (Aug. 19, 2008, 10:18 EST) [hereinafter The Plea]
(stating that plea bargains account for approximately nintey-five percent of all felony
convictions).
5. A "guilty plea" is "[a]n accused person's formal admission in court of having committed
the charged offense." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1268 (9th ed. 2009). Generally, a guilty plea
is a product of a plea bargain and "has the same effect as a guilty verdict and conviction after a
trial on the merits." Id.
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safeguards have been developed to protect the rights of defendants who enter
them.
6
Three federal circuits, however, refuse to enforce one of the procedural
safeguards included in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.7
In these circuits, courts deny defendants the right to be free of conviction of a
crime even though their conduct does not satisfy the statutory elements of that
crime. 8 A defendant is robbed of this right when a circuit court, reviewing a
defendant's conviction pursuant to a guilty plea, refuses to look beyond the
constitutionality of the plea to determine whether the defendant's conduct falls
within the definition of the charged crime.
9
In United States v. Cheney, the Eighth Circuit noted the circuit split
concerning whether defendants who enter unconditional guilty pleas, ° waive
their right to appeal the adequacy of the factual bases for their convictions
under Rule 1 l(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." The court,
however, did not address this issue because the defendant preserved the
adequacy determination for appeal, and the government did not argue that the
defendant's guilty plea barred review.12 The circuit split turns on the Rule
1 1(b)(3) inquiry: whether a circuit court must determine, in its review of a
conviction, that Rule 1 I(b)(3) is satisfied, or conversely, whether such review
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. See infra notes 27 & 90.
8. See infra Part I.G. 1.
9. See infra Part I.GI.
10. An unconditional guilty plea is the most common type of guilty plea employed in the
judicial system; the defendant admits guilt and waives all rights to appeal any adverse
determinations of his pretrial motions. See Gerard A. Riso, Note, People v. Thomas: The
Conditional Guilty Plea, 2 PACE L. REV. 101, 103-05 (1982). Conditional guilty pleas, on the
other hand, enable defendants to appeal adverse determinations of specified pretrial motions and,
if successful, to withdraw their guilty pleas and enter pleas of not guilty or nolo contendere. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1268 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a "conditional plea" as a "plea of
guilty or nolo contendere entered with the court's approval and the government's consent, the
defendant reserving the right to appeal any adverse determinations on one or more pretrial
motions"); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. I l(a)(2) (permitting a defendant to reserve the right to
appeal adverse determinations of specificed issues while simultaneously entering into a plea
agreement).
11. United States v. Cheney, 571 F.3d 764, 768 (8th Cir. 2009). Rule I l(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a trial court to "determine that there is a factual
basis" for a defendant's guilty plea before entering judgment on that plea. FED. R. CRIM. P.
I l(b)(3).
12. Cheney, 571 F.3d at 768-69 (explaining that although the defendant did not enter a
conditional guilty plea in compliance with Rule I1 (a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, he did reserve the right, in his plea agreement, to appeal the issue of whether his
possession of a firearm was "in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of [18
U.S.C.] § 924(c)(1)").
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is foreclosed by a circuit court's finding that a defendant's unconditional guilty
plea was knowing and voluntary.
1 3
The First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have held that a defendant can appeal
the adequacy of the factual basis for conviction after entering an unconditional
guilty plea. 14 The Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, have
held that a defendant's entrance of a "voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty
'is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge' and
constitutes an admission of all 'material facts alleged in the charge.'"15 Thus, a
knowing, voluntary, and unconditional guilty plea precludes review of the
adequacy issue in the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits.
16
This Comment examines the circuit split concerning whether the entrance of
an unconditional guilty plea waives a defendant's right to appeal the adequacy
of the factual basis for conviction and explores the appropriate resolution of
this issue. First, it traces the history of the modem-day guilty plea, and then
examines Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides
procedural safeguards to defendants by limiting the circumstances in which
federal criminal courts may accept guilty pleas. Specifically, this Comment
addresses the need-pursuant to Rule 1 l(b)(3)-for a district court to
determine that an adequate factual basis for a defendant's guilty plea exists.
Next, this Comment discusses United States v. Cheney and introduces a
detailed overview of the circuit split. It further analyzes the circuit split, each
circuit's compliance with the controlling law, and the policy implications of
each approach. This Comment then explores the avenues available to a
defendant to challenge the adequacy of the factual basis, and concludes that the
Eighth Circuit should join the First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits by permitting
review. Such a decision would create a majority position to which the
Supreme Court could turn in a future resolution of the issue. This Comment
advises that until the Supreme Court grants certiorari concerning this issue,
13. Compare United States v. Lacey, 569 F.3d 319, 323 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 431 (2009) (reviewing the adequacy of the factual basis for the defendant's conviction),
United States v. Spruill, 292 F.3d 207, 215 (5th Cir. 2002) (same), and United States v.
McKelvey, 203 F.3d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 2000) ("'While we ordinarily deem waived an issue not
raised before the district court, we will determine Rule II compliance for the first time on appeal
if the record is sufficiently developed."' (quoting United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d
1215, 1219 (1st Cir. 1995))), with United States v. McMillon, 89 F. App'x 561, 563-64 (6th Cir.
2004) (finding that the defendant waived his right to appeal the adequacy of the factual basis by
entering an intelligent and voluntary unconditional guilty plea), United States v. Johnson, 89 F.3d
778, 784 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (same), and United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir. 1993)
("A knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea to an offense conclusively establishes the
elements of the offense and the material facts necessary to support the conviction.").
14. Lacey, 569 F.3d at 323; United States v. Hildenbrand, 527 F.3d 466, 474-75 (5th Cir.
2008); McKelvey, 203 F.3d at 70.
15. Willis, 992 F.2d at 490 (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969));
United States v. Johnson, 888 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1989)); see McMillon, 89 F. App'x at
563-64; see also Johnson, 89 F.3d at 784.
16. See infra Part II.A.
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defendants would best serve their interests by following the approach used in
Cheney and entering conditional guilty pleas.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Role of the Guilty Plea in Modern Society
Since their introduction in the nineteenth century, guilty vleas have come to
occupy a central role in America's criminal-justice system. Traditional plea
bargains are an advantageous means of resolving criminal cases for both the
government and defendants: 18 they are "structured to avoid trials and clear
crowded court calendars without sacrificing convictions" while ensuring
defendants that prosecutors will not seek the maximum sentence, 19 will drop
certain charges, or both.20 As the Court stated in Brady v. United States:
17. See Earl G. Penrod, The Guilty Plea Process in Indiana: A Proposal to Strengthen the
Diminishing Factual Basis Requirement, 34 IND. L. REV. 1127, 1131-32 (2001). The roots of the
modem-day guilty plea can be traced back hundreds of years to the English common law. See
Barry J. Fisher, Judicial Suicide or Constitutional Autonomy? A Capital Defendant's Right to
Plead Guilty, 65 ALB. L. REV. 181, 183 (2001). England's most primitive form of the modem
guilty plea was its eleventh- and twelfth-century acknowledgement of confessions as an
appropriate ground for conviction. Id. (explaining that a thief who was "caught in the act could
'confess,' then be condemned and either pay a fine or forfeit his life"); see 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 901-02 (David Levinson ed., 2002) (explaining that the Catholic
Church's institution of an "inquisitorial system of justice" in the twelfth century led secular
judges to rely on confessions as "conclusive" proof of guilt). The American court system,
however, did not accept its first guilty plea until 1804. Commonwealth v. Battis, 1 Mass. 94, 95,
1 Will. 95, 95-96 (1804) (accepting a defendant's guilty plea only after determining that he was
sane and providing him time to reconsider the entry of his plea); Penrod, supra, at 1132. Nearly a
century later, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized for the first time the legitimacy
of a conviction based on a guilty plea. Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 324 (1892) (holding that
the defendant's guilty plea did not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
when the defendant was fully informed of his right to plead not guilty, was assigned competent
counsel, and was provided sufficient time to consider the implications of his plea); Penrod, supra,
at 1132. Still, defendants rarely entered guilty pleas prior to the 1830s. Mary E. Vogel, The
Social Origins of Plea Bargaining: Conflict and the Law in the Process of State Formation, 1830-
1860, 33 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 161, 172 (1999). After the emergence of plea bargains in the
nineteenth century, the number of guilty pleas entered increased drastically. Id. at 175 (noting the
increased percentages of guilty pleas in the Boston Police Court docket: less than 15% in 1830;
28.6% in 1840; 52% in 1850; 55.6% in 1860; and 88% in 1980). By 1860, "plea bargaining had
been solidly established and institutionalized; it was spreading by diffusion to other cities." Id. at
174.
18. Plea bargains are advantageous to both the government and the defendant because they
(1) allow a prosecutor to avoid the time and expenses inherent in a trial, and (2) provide the
defendant with "a measure of certainty and control relative to his sentence," which may result in a
promise of leniency. Note, Conditional Guilty Pleas, 93 HARV. L. REV. 564, 567 n.12 (1980).
19. But see STEVEN VAGO, LAW AND SOCIETY 107 (7th ed. 2003) ("Contrary to popular
belief, the ones who plead guilty do not, on the average, receive a lighter sentence than those who
do not.").
20. Riso, supra note 10, at 107.
1174 [Vol. 59:1171
Factual Appeals of Unconditional Guilty Pleas
It is this mutuality of advantage that perhaps explains the fact that at
present well over three-fourths of the criminal convictions ... rest on
pleas of guilty, a great many of them no doubt motivated at least in
part by the hope or assurance of a lesser penalty than might be
imposed if there were a guilty verdict after a trial to judge or jury.21
Because of this mutuality of advantage, both defendants and prosecutors
have come to rely upon guilty pleas, further entrenching their role in modem
society.
Undoubtedly, the use of guilty pleas has reached an unprecedented high. In
1980, approximately eighteen percent of federal criminal cases went to trial,
but that number declined to nine percent by 1987. 22  In recent years, plea
bargains have secured approximately ninety to ninety-five percent of all
criminal convictions.23 In 2006, the statistics exceeded this estimate: 76,778
(ninety-six percent) of the 79,904 criminal defendants who were convicted in
federal courts entered pleas of either guilty or nolo contendere.
24
Prosecutors fear that without guilty pleas "the system would be crippled by
,,25thousands of cases backlogged for trial. Against this backdrop, one can
easily understand how the American criminal-justice system has come to
26depend on guilty pleas to resolve the majority of criminal cases.
B. Procedural Safeguards Designed to Encourage the Entrance of Guilty
Pleas
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 11) 27 was
21. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
22. VAGO, supra note 19.
23. Id; see The Plea, supra note 3.
24. See 2006 STATISTICS, supra note 4.
25. Paula Reed Ward, Plead Guilty or Go to Trial?, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 2006, at
B1.
26. VAGO, supra note 19.
27. Rule 11, in pertinent part, provides:
(a) ENTERING A PLEA.
(2) Conditional Plea. With the consent of the court and the government, a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in
writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a
specified pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal may then withdraw the
plea.
(b) CONSIDERING AND ACCEPTING A GUILTY OR NOLO CONTENDERE PLEA.
(1) Advising and Questioning the Defendant. Before the court accepts a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere, the defendant may be placed under oath, and the court must
address the defendant personally in open court. During this address, the court must
inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the following:
2010] 1175
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developed to protect a criminal defendant's fundamental rights when entering a
guilty plea.28 Among the most significant protections provided to defendants
is the requirement that before accepting each plea, the court must find it to be
(A) the government's right, in a prosecution for perjury or false statement, to use
against the defendant any statement that the defendant gives under oath;
(B) the right to plead not guilty, or having already so pleaded, to persist in that
plea;
(C) the right to a jury trial;
(D) the right to be represented by counsel-and if necessary have the court
appoint counsel-at trial and at every other stage of the proceeding;
(E) the right at trial to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, to be
protected from compelled self-incrimination, to testify and present evidence, and to
compel the attendance of witnesses;
(F) the defendant's waiver of these trial rights if the court accepts a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere;
(G) the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading;
(H) any maximum possible penalty, including imprisonment, fine, and term of
supervised release;
(1) any mandatory minimum penalty;
(J) any applicable forfeiture;
(K) the court's authority to order restitution;
(L) the court's obligation to impose a special assessment;
(M) in determining a sentence, the court's obligation to calculate the applicable
sentencing-guideline range and to consider that range, possible departures under the
Sentencing Guidelines, and other sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); and
(N) the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to
collaterally attack the sentence.
(2) Ensuring That a Plea Is Voluntary. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and
determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises
(other than promises in a plea agreement).
(3) Determining the Factual Basis for a Plea. Before entering judgment on a guilty
plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.
(d) WITHDRAWING A GUILTY OR NOLO CONTENDERE PLEA. A defendant may
withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere:
(1) before the court accepts the plea, for any reason or no reason; or
(2) after the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes sentence if:
(A) the court rejects a plea agreement under Rule I (c)(5); or
(B) the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.
(g) RECORDING THE PROCEEDINGS. The proceedings during which the defendant
enters a plea must be recorded by a court reporter or by a suitable recording device. If
there is a guilty plea or a nolo contendere plea, the record must include the inquiries
and advice to the defendant required under Rule 11 (b) and (c).
(h) HARMLESS ERROR. A variance from the requirements of this rule is harmless error
if it does not affect substantial rights.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
28. See FED. R. CRIM. P. II advisory committee's note ("The fairness and adequacy of the
procedures on acceptance of pleas of guilty are of vital importance in according equal justice to
all in the federal courts.").
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knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 29 An "intelligent" plea must be based on
defense counsel's "reasonably competent advice" and the court's
communication informing the defendant of the rights waived by his entrance of
a guilty plea.30 To be "voluntary," a plea must not be the result of promises or
coercion, but rather must be the product of a defendant's own volition.31 These
requirements exist to ensure that a guilty plea, which effectively waives a
defendant's constitutional rights to trial, confrontation, and freedom from self-
incrimination, is not accepted unless valid.32
Furthermore, Rule 1 l(b)(3) requires the district court to determine the
existence of an adequate factual basis for the defendant's guilty plea. 33 The
29. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 182-83 (2005) (explaining that a guilty
plea is valid "only if done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently 'with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences"'); United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628-
29 (2002) (reasoning that the United States Constitution requires these procedural safeguards
because of the "seriousness" of pleading guilty); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618
(1998) (stating that the validity of a guilty plea depends on whether it is voluntary and
intelligent); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (explaining that the effects of a
guilty plea require that it be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent). For a list of the rights of which
a defendant must be advised, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(b)(1).
30. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970); see Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 242 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465-66 (1969). Notably, the
advice provided by counsel need not be correct; it need only be "within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." McMann, 397 U.S. at 771. For example, if a
defendant's attorney reasonably advised him that his confession would be admissible in court, but
the court subsequently ruled the confession inadmissible, the defendant's guilty plea entered on
the basis of that advice was still "intelligent," even though the attorney was incorrect. Parker v.
North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 797-98 (1970). Alternatively, a defendant could attack the
conviction collaterally, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006) (authorizing a court to vacate a sentence that is unconstitutional or
that violates a law of the United States). To state a cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel, a petitioner must prove (1) "that counsel's performance was deficient," (2) "that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense," and (3) "that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984). To establish the first element, the petitioner must show that "counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
[petitioner] by the Sixth Amendment." Id. To prove the second element, the petitioner must
show that "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable." Id. Petitioners seldom prevail on such claims due to the amount of
deference courts afford attorneys in determining whether they acted ineffectively. See id. at 687,
699-700. Moreover, the government may require the petitioner to waive his right to appeal in the
plea agreement under § 2255. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(b)(1)(N).
31. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(b)(2); see also Brady, 397 U.S. at 748-50; Parker, 397 U.S. at
795 (finding a defendant's guilty plea voluntary when he failed to inform his attorney that the
police coerced his confession, he issued sworn statements to the court testifying that his plea was
voluntary, and he accused the police of misconduct only after he served several months of his
sentence).
32. FED. R. CRIM. P. I l(b)(1); Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
33. FED. R. CRIM. P. I (b)(3); see United States v. Wilson, 305 F. App'x 598, 599 (11th
Cir. 2008); Spiridigliozzi v. United States, 117 F. App'x 385, 392 (6th Cir. 2004); cf United
States v. Delgado-Hemandez, 420 F.3d 16, 28 (Ist Cir. 2005) ("Because the government's
2010] 1177
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factual basis requirement ensures that a defendant's past conduct satisfies the
definition of the crime to which he intends to plead guilty.34 The rule operates
to "ensure that 'the court make clear exactly what a defendant admits to, and
whether those admissions are factually sufficient to constitute the alleged
crime."' 35 To determine whether an adequate factual basis exists, a trial judge
should consider whether the entire record contains sufficient evidence to
justify a plea for the charged crime. 36  Rule 1 1(d) enables a defendant to
withdraw a guilty plea "for any reason or no reason at all" before the court
accepts the plea, or after the court has accepted it if there is "a fair and just
reason for requesting the withdrawal. 37
In the 1969 case McCarthy v. United States, the Supreme Court explained
that Rule 11 requirements, although not "constitutionally mandated," serve a
constitutional end by ensuring that a defendant's plea is knowing and
voluntary.38  Under Rule I I(b)(3), "[t]he judge must determine 'that the
conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the
indictment or information or an offense included therein to which the
defendant has pleaded guilty.' 39 A district court's failure to "fully adher[e] to
the procedure provided for in Rule 11" entitles the defendant to "plead anew,"
regardless of the severity of such deviations. The Court reasoned that this
position not only guarantees the "procedural safeguards" of Rule 11 for all
proffered evidence lacked a rational basis in facts for the 'in furtherance of' element of the...
charge, the district court erred in determining that there was an adequate factual predicate for [the
defendant's] guilty plea.").
34. FED. R. CRIM. P. II advisory committee's note ("Such an inquiry should, e.g., protect a
defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the
charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge.").
35. United States v. Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652, 659-60 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States
v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991)).
36. FED. R. CRIM. P. II advisory committee's note; 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 663
(2008); see, e.g., United States v. Adams, 961 F.2d 505, 509 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)
(explaining that in determining whether a factual basis exists, the court must examine the
information and the plea hearing, and "[i]n some cases it might also be permissible for the district
court to turn to the Presentence Report"); John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and
Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas but Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88, 118-19
(1977) (explaining that a factual basis may be determined through "inquiry of the defendant,
inquiry of the prosecutor, or examination of the presentence report" or any other method a judge
deems appropriate).
37. FED. R. CRIM. P. I I(d). Whether a procedural Rule II deficiency, such as a court's
failure to inform a defendant of its "obligation to impose a special assessment," constitutes a "fair
and just reason" for a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea is a question that this Comment
leaves for another day. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(b)(l)(L).
38. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969).
39. Id. at 467 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. II advisory committee's note).
40. Id. at 463-64. In McCarthy, the district court failed to "personally inquire whether [the
defendant] understood the nature of the charge" when he pleaded guilty to intentional tax evasion
but stated that his conduct resulted from "'neglectful' and 'inadvertent"' record-keeping. Id. at
462,464.
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defendants, but also reduces the "great waste of judicial resources" used to
evaluate appeals of guilty pleas in the absence of adequate trial records.4' In so
holding, the Court did not distinguish among violations of the various Rule 11
requirements, but rather implied that any formal violation provided the
42defendant an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.
Following this decision, courts divided over whether the rule articulated in
McCarthy--that a technical Rule 11 deficiency enables a defendant to plead
anew-applied to all Rule 11 violations or merely some of these violations.4 3
To a limited extent, the Court addressed this issue in its 1978 decision, United
States v. Timmreck.4 In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy
to distribute controlled substances.45 Before accepting the defendant's guilty
plea, the district court judge informed the defendant that he could be fined
$25,000 and sentenced to fifteen years in prison.46 The judge, however, failed
to inform the defendant that a "mandatory special parole term of at least 3
years" also applied.47  Two years after the district court sentenced the
defendant, he moved to vacate his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,48
41. Id. at 472.
42. See id. at 468-69. One year later, the Supreme Court heard a case in which the
defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder but maintained his innocence during his plea
hearing. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28 & 29 n.2 (1970). The Court held that a
defendant's express admission of guilt in the entrance of a guilty plea was "not a constitutional
requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty. An individual accused of crime may voluntarily,
knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is
unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime." Id at 37. The
Court upheld the conviction premised on the guilty plea despite the defendant's denial of the facts
as set forth by the government. Id. The Court concluded that the plea was valid because it was
knowing and voluntary and because the record contained "strong evidence of actual guilt." Id. at
37-38. In so holding, the Court found an adequate factual basis for the plea despite the
defendant's contention to the contrary. Id. at 38.
43. FED. R. CRIM. P. II advisory committee's note (observing conflict among courts
regarding whether to allow defendants to plead anew after Rule II violations when the doctrine
of harmless error would otherwise preclude it). Compare United States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d
166, 173 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding that the district court's failure to explain the meaning of
"conspiracy" to the defendant did not mandate reversal because the Rule 11 proceedings showed
that the defendant understood the charges), with United States v. Boone, 543 F.2d 1090, 1092
(4th Cir. 1976) ("[T]he failure to advise the defendant with respect to his right against self-
incrimination, to instruct him that there would be no trial of any kind, and to warn him of possible
perjury peril compels reversal."), and United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633, 634, 636-37 (2d
Cir. 1976) (holding that the defendant must be "specifically informed of each and every element
enumerated in Rule II [or] the plea must be vacated").
44. United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 781 (1979).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 781-82.
47. Id. at 782.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) provides that:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without
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alleging that the judge violated Rule 11 by failing to inform him of the
mandatory special parole term before accepting his guilty plea.49 The district
court denied the defendant's motion to vacate, but the Sixth Circuit reversed,
finding that a technical violation of Rule II supported a collateral attack.50
Relying on its decision in Hill v. United States,51 the Supreme Court held in
Timmreck that not all "formal" Rule 11 violations mandate reversal and
reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision, implying that a difference exists between
"formal" violations and other, substantive violations. 52  The Court also
explained that claims of "technical" violations must be raised on direct appeal
rather than in a collateral action.53  In reaching its conclusion, the Court
emphasized the importance of "finality" in court decisions, discussed its role in
building "'confidence in the integrity of our procedures,"' and explained that
allowing collateral attacks premised on formal Rule 11 violations would
"'increas[e] the volume of judicial work, inevitably delay[ing] and impair[ing]
the orderly administration of justice.' 54 Importantly, however, Timmreck did
not overturn McCarthy because Timmreck addressed only collateral attacks-
not direct appeals.55
C. The Emergence of the Conditional Guilty Plea
Critics questioned whether the Rule 11 protections described above
sufficiently protected a defendant's basic rights; they argued that the guilty
56plea was a double-edged sword. To further safeguard a defendant's rights
jurisdiction to impose such sentence . . .or is otherwise subject to collateral attack,
may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2006).
49. Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 782.
50. Id at 782-83.
51. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962). In Hill, the defendant collaterally attacked
his conviction-premised on a guilty plea-pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Id. at 425. He alleged
that the trial court deprived him of the opportunity to speak before being sentenced, but the Court
did not recognize this as ground for reversal. Id. at 425, 428-29.
52. Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 783-84.
53. Id. at 784.
54. Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 528 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
55. Seeid. at781.
56. Riso, supra note 10, at 107 (explaining that a defendant who pleads not guilty will likely
confront "more severe charges at trial and face[] harsher punishment if convicted," but one who
pleads guilty will "forfeit[] his right to appeal any nonjurisdictional defects"). Before the
enactment of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant who wanted to appeal an
unfavorable ruling on a pretrial motion risked little by going to trial. G. Fred Metos, Appellate
Advocacy, THE CHAMPION, May 2001, at 33, 34. The adoption of the sentencing guidelines,
however, provided defendants an incentive to plead guilty-an "offense level reduction for [the]
acceptance of responsibility." Id The sentencing guidelines expressly authorize a sentence
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when entering a guilty plea, Congress amended Rule 11 in 1983 to provide for
conditional guilty pleas. 57  Prior to the creation of Rule 1 l(a)(2), which
provides for conditional guilty pleas, 58 a defendant was generally required to
assert certain objections, motions, and defenses-specifically, those addressed
in Rule 12(b)--during the pretrial stage.59 Interlocutory appeals of adverse
determinations were "seldom permitted," and a defendant's subsequent guilty
plea "usually foreclose[d] later appeal with respect to denial of [any] pretrial
motion[s].,, 60 Thus, the 1983 amendment that created Rule 1 l(a)(2) enables a
defendant to enter a guilty plea while simultaneously preserving his right to
. ... . 61
appeal adverse determinations of specified pretrial motions. Additionally,
Rule 1 l(a)(2) allows a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea in the event that
he appeals62 and the circuit court rules in his favor. 6 3 The overall purpose of
this amendment is to "conserve prosecutorial and judicial resources and
advance speedy trial objectives." 64 The amendment also resolved the circuit
reduction of up to two levels if the defendant "clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility
for his offense." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El .1 (2006).
57. FED. R. CRIM. P. II advisory committee's note; 6 DAVID A. SCHLUETER ET AL.,
WEST'S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 6886 (3d ed. 1999). In fact, the Second Circuit
adopted this practice prior to the amendment, and the Third Circuit followed its lead. IA
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ANDREW LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 174 (3d
ed. 2008). For a comparison of conditional and unconditional guilty pleas, see supra note 10.
58. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(a)(2).
59. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note. Rule 12(b)(3) specifies that a
defendant must raise the following motions at the pretrial stage: "a motion alleging a defect in
instituting the prosecution," "a motion alleging a defect in the indictment or information," "a
motion to suppress evidence," "a Rule 14 motion to sever charges or defendants," and "a Rule 16
motion for discovery." FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3).
60. FED. R. CRIM. P. II advisory committee's note.
61. See id.
62. Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth the proper procedure
for appealing an adverse determination of a specified pretrial motion. SCHLUETER ET AL., supra
note 57. Rule 4(b)(3)(A) states
[i]f a defendant timely makes any of the following motions under the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the notice of appeal from a judgment of conviction must be
filed within 10 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining
motion, or within 10 days after the entry of the judgment of conviction, whichever
period ends later. This provision applies to a timely motion:
(i) for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29;
(ii) for a new trial under Rule 33, but if based on newly discovered evidence,
only if the motion is made no later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment; or
(iii) for arrest ofjudgment under Rule 34.
FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(3)(A).
63. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(a)(2).
64. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note; see Guilty Plea: Accepting the Plea-
The Nature of Guilty Pleas, http://law.jrank.org/pages/1275/Guilty-Plea-Accepting-Plea-nature-
guilty-pleas.html (last visited July 20, 2010) (explaining that the purpose of a conditional guilty
plea is to avoid the waste of going forth with trial "just to preserve the defendant's right to
appeal"). Conditional guilty pleas are based on the theory that, "if legal issues raise matters of
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split over whether courts may accept conditional guilty pleas in the absence of
65
specific legislation authorizing their use,
D. The Default: Unconditional Guilty Pleas
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure lack an express provision
,,66authorizing "unconditional guilty pleas. The 1983 Advisory Committee
Note, however, refers to "traditional, unqualified pleas" and expresses the idea
that these pleas, unlike conditional guilty pleas, "constitute a waiver of
nonjurisdictional defects." 67  Therefore, unconditional guilty pleas "usually... . ,68
foreclose later appeal with respect to denial of [any] pretrial motion.' The
circuits remain split, however, on whether a defendant's unconditional guilty
plea forecloses his right to appeal the adequacy of the factual basis for his
conviction, in part because it remains unclear whether the lack of a factual
basis constitutes a jurisdictional error.69
E. General Reviewability of Appeals from Convictions Based on Guilty Pleas
In United States v. Broce, the Supreme Court described the reviewability of
appeals made by defendants who were convicted after entering unconditional
guilty pleas but then alleged nonjurisdictional defects on appeal. 70 According
to the Court, "[a] plea of guilty and the ensuing conviction comprehend all of
the factual and legal elements necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of
guilt and a lawful sentence." 7' Thus, the Court articulated the following rule:
after a court has accepted a guilty plea and entered judgment upon it, a
public importance-such as police misconduct in Fourth Amendment cases-the appellate courts
should be able to hear them." Id.
65. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note (explaining that the Second and
Third Circuits accepted the use of unconditional guilty pleas, and the Eighth and District of
Columbia Circuits "praised" such a practice, while the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits held that
such pleas were "improper"). Despite the drafters' acceptance of the conditional guilty plea,
there exists no right to enter one. United States v. Fisher, 772 F.2d 371, 374 (7th Cir. 1985) (per
curiam). In fact, several states expressly prohibit the use of conditional guilty pleas in the
absence of specific statutory authority. See State v. Hodge, 882 P.2d 1, 6 (N.M. 1994) (noting the
following states' refusal to accept conditional guilty pleas: Arizona, Iowa, Montana, and Rhode
Island). But see id. (noting the following states' acceptance of conditional guilty pleas: Alaska,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia). Despite vast support for
conditional guilty pleas, they remain "the exception, not the rule." United States v. Bundy, 392
F.3d 641, 645 (4th Cir. 2004). Moreover, "neither the courts nor the government have any duty,
either statutory or constitutional, to inform defendants" about the possibility of entering a
conditional plea. Fisher, 772 F.2d at 375.
66. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
67. FED. R. CRIM. P. II advisory committee's note.
68. Id.
69. See infra Part II.A-B.
70. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989).
71. Id.
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defendant's subsequent appeal is limited to considerations of "whether the
underlying plea was both counseled and voluntary., 72 If the plea is found to be
"counseled and voluntary," then generally further review is foreclosed.73 The
vigor of this rule is limited to cases where an appellant asserts a
nonjurisdictional defect; it does not apply to alleged jurisdictional defects
"where on the face of the record the court had no power to enter the
conviction." 74  Thus, the issue underlying the circuit split is whether an
inadequate factual basis constitutes a jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional
defect.7 5
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. Whether a claim is "'jurisdictional' and therefore appealable depends on whether the
claim can be resolved by examining the face of the indictment or the record at the time of the plea
without requiring further proceedings." United States v. Caperell, 938 F.2d 975, 977-78 (9th Cir.
1991). An indictment's failure to charge an offense is not waived by a defendant's unconditional
guilty plea. Id
75. Circuit courts have ruled both ways on this issue. For example, in United States v.
White, the Fifth Circuit held that a defendant's unconditional guilty plea did not preclude his
subsequent appeal challenging the sufficiency of his indictment. United States v. White, 258 F.3d
374, 379 (5th Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit expressly categorized the failure of an indictment to
set forth facts which would satisfy the elements of the charged offense as a 'jurisdictional
defect[]," and the court reasoned that it was willing to "reverse on direct appeal where the factual
basis for the plea as shown [in the] record fails to establish an element of the offense of
conviction." Id. at 379-80 (emphasis added). Eight years later, the Seventh Circuit held that a
defendant's guilty plea waived his right to argue that the facts alleged by the government failed to
satisfy one of the elements of the crime for which he was convicted. United States v. Lacey, 569
F.3d 319, 323 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 431 (2009). In that case, the defendant was
charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) by possessing child pornography. Id. at 321.
This statute required the government to prove that the defendant knowingly possessed material
"that contain[ed] an image of child pornography," and that such material was "mailed, or shipped
or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means." 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B)
(2006). On appeal, the defendant contended that the government failed to satisfy the third
element of the offense-the "jurisdictional element." Lacey, 569 F.3d at 322-23. The court
disagreed, however, and held that the satisfaction of an element is "jurisdictional 'only in the
shorthand sense that without that . . . nexus, there can be no federal crime. . . . It is not
jurisdictional in the sense that it affects a court's subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., a court's
constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate a case .... ' Id. at 323 (quoting United States v.
Martin, 147 F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 1998)).
Even those circuit courts willing to review the adequacy of the factual basis do not apply a
uniform standard of review. See, e.g., United States v. Lindsay, 238 F. App'x 582, 589 (1 th Cir.
2007) ("The standard for evaluating challenges to the factual basis for a guilty plea is whether the
district court was presented with evidence from which it could reasonably find that the defendant
was guilty."); United States v. Byrd, 220 F. App'x 421,424 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying the abuse of
discretion standard); United States v. Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying the
plain error standard); Barkai, supra note 36, at 123 ("A federal court standard of proof for factual
basis is virtually nonexistent."). The issue concerning the appropriate standard of proof for Rule
I l(b)(3) review exceeds the scope of this Comment. Rather than encouraging the application of
one standard over another, this Comment argues that regardless of which standard courts apply,
review of adequacy of determinations is appropriate.
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F. United States v. Cheney: A Unique Approach
In 2009, the Eighth Circuit correctly noted that the law is "unsettled"
regarding "whether a defendant can appeal the adequacy of a factual basis [for
his conviction] after entering an unconditional guilty plea." 76 United States v.
Cheney involved a defendant, Holland, who pleaded guilty to conspiring to
manufacture and distribute at least five hundred grams of methamphetamine
and using a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.77 In his plea
agreement, Holland waived his right to appeal his conviction. 78  Although
Holland's guilty plea was technically unconditional, he included the following
typed statement in the plea agreement: "The defendant retains the right to
appeal the factual basis for [his] conviction and sentence in Count II,
Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking crime."
79
Defense counsel expressly brought this provision of the plea agreement to the
court's attention during the plea hearing. 80 The Cheney court, in turn, did not
address the issue of whether a defendant who enters an unconditional guilty
plea waives his right to appeal the adequacy of the factual basis for his
conviction because the defendant expressly reserved this right for appeal, and
the government did not challenge this reservation.
81
Prior to Cheney, the Eighth Circuit struggled with this issue in United States
82v. Marks and United States v. Beck. In Marks, the defendant appealed his
conviction and alleged, among other claims, that the trial court failed to
establish an adequate factual basis before accepting his guilty plea.83 Despite
the defendant's unconditional guilty plea, the Eighth Circuit reviewed the
factual basis and affirmed the trial court's decision to accept the guilty plea
because it determined that the methods the district court used to establish an
adequate factual basis were sufficient.
84
76. United States v. Cheney, 571 F.3d 764, 768 (8th Cir. 2009).
77. Id. at 767-68; see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006) (criminalizing the use of a firearm,
"during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking.., in furtherance of any such
crime").
78. Cheney, 571 F.3d at 768.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 769.
82. Compare United States v. Beck, 250 F.3d 1163, 1166 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
defendant waived his right to appeal the adequacy of the factual basis for his conviction by
entering a valid and unconditional guilty plea), with United States v. Marks, 38 F.3d 1009, 1012-
13 (8th Cir. 1994) (reviewing the adequacy of the factual basis for conviction even though the
defendant entered an unconditional guilty plea).
83. Marks, 38 F.3d at 1011. Marks was convicted after he pled guilty to "one count of
conspiracy to distribute cocaine, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and one count of conspiracy to
launder money, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 ." Id.
84. Id. at 1012-13. In determining that an adequate factual basis existed for the alleged
crime of conspiracy to distribute cocain, the Eighth Circuit relied on the defendant's admissions
during the plea hearing that he had an "understanding with others to possess and distribute
cocaine" and that he helped clients "achieve their goals." Id. at 1013.
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Seven years later, the Eighth Circuit found that a defendant's knowing and
voluntary guilty plea precluded review of the factual basis's adequacy.85 Beck
pleaded guilty to arson in district court, and after he admitted that his conduct
satisfied each element of the offense, the court accepted his plea and sentenced
him.8 6  Beck then appealed, arguing that one of the elements was not
satisfied.87  At the time of Beck's appeal, the Supreme Court issued a new
decision that "'substantially changed the law of the Eighth Circuit"' regarding
the element of the crime that Beck disputed.88 Still, the Eighth Circuit declined
to review the factual basis:
By pleading guilty, Beck waived his right to appeal the district
court's finding that the interstate commerce element was satisfied.
"The general rule is that ... a valid guilty plea forecloses an attack
on a conviction unless 'on the face of the record the court had no
power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence.
' 89
The Eighth Circuit's own inconsistency is representative of the lack of
uniformity between federal circuit courts concerning this issue.
G. Division over the Rule 1l(b)(3) Inquiry Leads to a Circuit Split
1. Jurisdictions that Treat an Unconditional Guilty Plea as a Waiver of a
Defendant's Right to Appeal the Adequacy of the Factual Basis
The Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that a valid guilty plea
precludes a circuit court from reviewing the adequacy of the factual basis for
conviction because a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea conclusively satisfies
85. Beck, 250 F.3d at 1166-67.
86. Id. at 1164-65. Conviction of arson requires proof of (1) malicious damage or
destruction, (2) by means of fire or explosives, (3) to a building or other property used in foreign
or interstate commerce or in an activity affecting foreign or interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. §
844(i) (2006).
87. Beck, 250 F.3d at 1164-65.
88. Id. at 1165 (quoting United States v. Rea, 223 F.3d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 2000)). After
Beck pleaded guilty to arson in violation of § 844(i), id at 1164-65, the Supreme Court heard
Jones v. United States, a case that also involved a violation of § 844(i). See Jones v. United
States, 529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000). In Jones, the Court held that the jurisdictional interstate
commerce element of § 844(i) was "narrower in scope than [the Eighth Circuit's] previous cases
had suggested." Beck, 250 F.3d at 1165; see Jones, 529 U.S. at 859. Before Jones, the Eighth
Circuit held that the building needed only a "passive connection to interstate commerce" to
satisfy that element of the crime. United States v. Ryan, 227 F.3d 1058, 1062 (8th Cir. 2000).
After Jones, however, the building had to be "actively employed in interstate commerce." Id. at
1061-62. This change led Beck to appeal his conviction and argue that the interstate commerce
element was not satisfied in his case. Beck, 250 F.3d at 1165.
89. Beck, 250 F.3d at 1166 (quoting Walker v. United States, 115 F.3d 603, 604 (8th Cir.
1997)).
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all elements of the charged offense and thereby establishes an adequate factual
basis.90
Because the entrance of an unconditional guilty plea waives a defendant's
right to appeal "all nonjurisdictional defects," review on appeal is limited to
whether the plea was made knowingly and voluntarily. 92 Thus, when a court in
the Fourth, Sixth, or Eleventh Circuit finds that a guilty plea was
constitutional, it is precluded from inquiring into the adequacy of the factual
basis.93 This approach is based on the rationale that the Rule 11 requirements
are intended to "insure ... that the defendant validly waived his constitutional
rights by his guilty plea."94 Therefore, as long as a defendant knowingly and
voluntarily enters an unconditional guilty plea, his right to appeal the factual
basis for his conviction is waived. 95
Despite the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits' general adherence to this
rule of law, a substantial number of decisions by these courts have quietly
90. See, e.g., United States v. Studabaker, 578 F.3d 423, 429 (6th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Bonilla, 579 F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Holland, 101 F. App'x 600,
603 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a defendant's unconditional guilty plea to the possession with
intent to distribute cocaine barred an assertion upon appeal that the substance was not cocaine);
United States v. Johnson, 89 F.3d 778, 784 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d
489, 490 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing the "basic and longstanding principle" that a constitutional
guilty plea "conclusively establishes the elements of the offense" (emphasis added)); Stano v.
Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1141 (1 1th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Freed, 688 F.2d 24, 25-
26 (6th Cir. 1982) (explaining that a plea of nolo contendere, like a guilty plea, "'admit[s] every
essential element of the offense' (quoting United States v. Heller, 579 F.2d 990, 998 (6th Cir.
1978))).
91. See, e.g., Willis, 992 F.2d at 490. For an explanation of how to determine if a claim is
"jurisdictional," see supra note 74.
92. See United States v. Lindsay, 238 F. App'x 582, 588 n.2 (llth Cir. 2007) ("[Althoughl
an unconditional guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional arguments, it is well-
settled that for a plea to effect such a waiver, the plea itself must be knowing and voluntary."); see
also United States v. McMillon, 89 F. App'x 561, 564 (6th Cir. 2004); Willis, 992 F.2d at 490.
93. See cases cited supra note 90. Such a finding, however, does not bar a defendant from
seeking post-conviction relief. A defendant convicted pursuant to an unconditional guilty plea
may attack the conviction collaterally under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Section 2255 provides:
(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without
jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the
maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2006). For example, a claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel is not
barred by a defendant's unconditional guilty plea because it forms the basis of a collateral attack
pursuant to § 2255. See discussion supra note 30.
94. United States v. Deal, 678 F.2d 1062, 1064 n.4 (1 I th Cir. 1982).
95. Id.; see cases cited supra note 90.
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disregarded circuit precedent by reviewing the adequacy of factual bases after
defendants have entered unconditional guilty pleas.
2. Jurisdictions that Do Not Treat an Unconditional Guilty Plea as a
Waiver of a Defendant's Right to Appeal the Factual Basis for
Determination
The First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits review the adequacy of the factual
basis regardless of a defendant's unconditional guilty plea.97 In these circuits,
the courts "determine Rule 11 compliance for the first time on appeal if the
record is sufficiently developed. ' '98 A court retains "the power to review if the
factual basis for the plea fails to establish an element of the offense" to which
the defendant pleaded guilty, even if the defendant expressly waived his right
to appeal. 99
The position of the First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits is largely based on the
plain language of Rule I l(b)(3), which prohibits a court from "entering
96. See, e.g., United States v. Ketchum, 550 F.3d 363, 366-68 (4th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Major, 297 F. App'x 246, 249-50 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); United States v. Alan, 258 F.
App'x 617, 618-19 (4th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); United States v. Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652, 660
(4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Byrd, 220 F. App'x 421, 424 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v.
McCreary-Redd, 475 F.3d 718, 721 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Green, 182 F. App'x 247,
247-48 (4th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); United States v. DePace, 120 F.3d 233, 238-39 (11 th Cir.
1997).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Lacey, 569 F.3d 319, 323 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 431 (2009); United States v. Hildenbrand, 527 F.3d 466, 474-75 (5th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Spruill, 292 F.3d 207, 214-
15 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. White, 258 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
McKelvey, 203 F.3d 66, 69-70 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d
1215, 1219 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Japa, 994 F.2d 899, 903-04 (1st Cir. 1993).
98. McKelvey, 203 F.3d at 70, 72 (quoting Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d at 1219). In
McKelvey, the First Circuit determined that when the defendant was charged with possessing at
least three "matters constituting child pornography," he actually possessed only one such matter,
and thus, no factual basis existed for the district court's acceptance of his guilty plea. Id. at 68,
71-72. In United States v. Japa, the defendant was charged with conspiracy "to possess cocaine
with intent to distribute" and "with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a public or private
school." Japa, 994 F.2d at 900. The district court failed to inquire into the defendant's intent,
and the prosecution failed to allege the proximity of any school. Id. at 904. Nonetheless, the
court affirmed the conviction because the requisite information pertaining to the proximity of a
school was presented in a presentencing report, and the defendant admitted to the court that he
possessed and intended to distribute the cocaine. Id.
99. Baymon, 312 F.3d at 727-29 (reviewing whether the "public official" element of the
crime was satisfied and thus, whether a factual basis for the defendant's plea existed despite his
admission in open court that the "public official" element was satisfied); see White, 258 F.3d at
380 ("The government cites no authority, and we are aware of none, that holds that a defendant
can waive his substantive fight 'to be free of prosecution under an indictment that fails to charge
an offense .... ' (quoting United States v. Meacham, 626 F.2d 503, 509 (5th Cir. 1980))). In
White, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the adequacy of the factual basis even though the defendant
waived the right to appeal "any error" pursuant to the conditions of his plea agreement. Id.
(emphasis added).
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judgment on a guilty plea" before "determin[ing] that there is a factual basis
for the plea."' 00 A court's failure to find a factual basis before convicting the
defendant "would nullify the plea itself' and therefore defeat any argument
that the defendant's guilty plea waived his right to appeal.101  The Rule
1 I(b)(3) requirement operates "'to protect a defendant who may plead with an
understanding of the nature of the charge, but without realizing that his
conduct does not actually fall within the definition of the crime charged."
' 0 2
Requiring a circuit court to review the adequacy of the factual basis enforces
Rule I l(b)(3) and ensures the constitutionality of a defendant's guilty plea. 10 3
These circuits reject arguments concerning waiver of appeal because such a
waiver could "depriv[e] a person of his liberty" for engaging in non-criminal
conduct.10
4
II. CHENEYAS A "SAFE BET": CIRCUMVENTING THE SHORTCOMINGS OF
LIMITED REVIEW
A. A Limited Review: The Position of the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits
The Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits consider a defendant's
unconditional guilty plea a waiver of his right to appeal the factual basis for
conviction, holding that a defendant's guilty plea conclusively establishes all
elements of the charged crime. 0 5 Thus, these circuits limit their review to the
knowing and voluntary nature of a defendant's guilty plea.'0 6
In the seminal case of McCarthy v. United States, the Supreme Court
explained that although Rule 1 l(b)(3) and the other Rule 11 requirements are
not "constitutionally mandated," they aid a "district judge in making the
constitutionally required determination that a defendant's guilty plea is truly
voluntary."' 7  In this way, the existence of an adequate factual basis is
"inextricably" connected to the constitutionality of a defendant's guilty plea
and serves a purpose beyond mere formality.
0 8
100. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3).
101. See United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 2000).
102. United States v. Denson, 183 F. App'x 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Spruill, 292
F.3d at 215).
103. See United States v. McCarthy, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969).
104. White, 258 F.3d at 380 (explaining that where a defendant's unconditional guilty plea
waives the right to appeal the factual basis of conviction, the defendant may be convicted of a
crime even if the conduct does not satisfy the statutory definition of the crime).
105. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
107. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 465. But see Barkai, supra note 36, at 91 ("Regardless of the
vigor with which the intelligence and voluntariness inquiries are pursued, that effort is largely
wasted ifa defendant is allowed to plead unknowingly to a charge within which his conduct does
not fall.").
108. See Barkai, supra note 36, at 112 (explaining that the McCarthy Court indicated that the
constitutional requirements of a defendant's guilty plea and the Rule I l(b)(3) requirement were
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The theory advanced by the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits undermines
the factors articulated by McCarthy, which are used to determine a plea's
constitutionality. These circuits err by insisting that a constitutional guilty plea
precludes Rule 1 l(b)(3) review, when in fact McCarthy mandates that
consideration of the relevant factors, including Rule I I(b)(3) compliance, is a
prerequisite to determining constitutionality. '
09
Moreover, the interpretation by the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits
effectively nullifies Rule 1 l(b)(3). 110 By denying review of Rule 1 1(b)(3)
determinations, circuit courts refuse to enforce this rule. Such refusal enables
a district court to disregard Rule I l(b)(3) without fearing review, let alone
reversal. Thus, where defendants' unconditional guilty pleas are
constitutional, these circuits review the district court proceedings in essentially
the same manner as if Rule 11 (b)(3) did not exist. It is bizarre to claim that,
should a judge err in finding an adequate factual basis where none exists-a
determination which goes to the heart of a conviction-a defendant has no
111
recourse.
Furthermore, this interpretation is contrary to the purposes of the criminal
code, which federal courts seek to enforce through criminal proceedings."
2
Among the purposes of the code is the need "to provide for the just
determination of every criminal proceeding . . . and fairness in
administration."' 13 It can hardly be argued that a circuit court that denies
review of a district court's erroneous findings operates to ensure justice and
fairness. Certainly, courts err. It should be no surprise, then, that defendants
lacking the legal expertise of judges-even with the assistance of competent
"inextricably linked" because a guilty plea "cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant
possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts" (quoting McCarthy, 394 U.S. at
466)). Based on this reasoning, some academics have argued that the factual basis requirement
"is an element of due process and therefore is a federal constitutional requirement for a valid
plea." Id. at 112 n.156.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
110. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(b)(3) (requiring courts to find a factual basis for a guilty plea
before accepting it). Compliance with the constitutionality requirement does not render the other
provisions of Rule 11 (b) meaningless. In any other context, such a proposal would be absurd.
After all, Rule I l(b)(2), which requires that a guilty plea be voluntary, and Rule 1 l(b)(3), which
requires the court to determine that a factual basis exists, are separately mandated-not
alternative-provisions. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(b)(2), I l(b)(3).
11. See United States v. Byrd, 220 F. App'x 421, 424 n.3 (6th Cir. 2007) (implying that a
Rule I l(b)(3) determination goes "to the very validity of a guilty plea"); see also United States v.
White, 258 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that such a position could effectively
"depriv[e] a person of his liberty" for engaging in non-criminal conduct).
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 3001 (referring to Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in
addressing the purpose of the United States Code); FED. R. CRIM. P. 2 (describing the manner in
which the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be construed).
113. FED. R. CRIM. P.2.
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counsel-may miscalculate their own guilt."l 4  Nonetheless, such
miscalculations still constitute "intelligent" and "voluntary" pleas, thereby
precluding review of the factual basis determination." 15  It is fundamentally
unfair to preclude review under Rule 1 l(b)(3) because defendants were too
ignorant" to know that their beliefs that they committed crimes were
erroneous.l17 By precluding review, a court forces a defendant either to enter a
conditional guilty plea or to go to trial to preserve the right to appeal the
sufficiency of the evidence. In jurisdictions where conditional guilty pleas are
not recognized,' 1 8 or in cases where the government refuses a defendant's
conditional guilty plea," 19 a defendant is forced to go to trial, contrary to the
interests of judicial economy.120
Perhaps district and appellate courts in the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits have recognized this irrationality to some extent as each has deviated
from its own circuit's precedent.1
21
114. See Estes v. State, 294 So. 2d 122, 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) ("It is not difficult to
imagine an accused standing before the bar of justice accused of a crime he thinks he committed
but really did not."); Barkai, supra note 36, at 134-35 ("Ignorance of the nuances of the law is
hardly rare. . . . [A] defendant often lacks the legal expertise to determine whether his actions
constitute the crime in question.").
115. For an explication of the requirements of an "intelligent" and "voluntary" plea, see
supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
116. Approximately eighty to ninety percent of criminal defendants "qualify for indigent
defense." National Center for State Courts, Indigent Defense FAQs, http://www.ncsconline.org/
WC/CourTopics/FAQs.asp?topic=lndDef#FAQ534 (last visited July 20, 2010). Most of these
indigent defendants likely lack the education and skill necessary to comprehend the complexities
of modem law. See Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 140 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(explaining that many indigent defendants lack fundamental literacy skills and most likely did not
finish high school).
117. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 85 (1971) (explaining that the "desired
outcome" of a criminal trial is that the court declare a defendant guilty "if and only if he has
committed the offense with which he is charged"). This Comment advocates the review of
district court Rule I l(b)(3) determinations but does not necessarily suggest the adoption of an
"accuracy requirement." See Barkai, supra note 36, at 90 (arguing that the federal standard for
Rule 11 (b)(3) review should be one of "accuracy"; that is, whether the conduct actually
constitutes the charged crime).
118. See supra note 65.
119. See FED. R. CRIM. P. I l(a)(2); supra note 65.
120. See Ward, supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of guilty
pleas); Note, Conditional Guilty Pleas, supra note 18, at 565, 573 (explaining that "judicial
economy favor[s] the conditional plea" because forcing defendants to go to trial may "add to the
burden of already crowded trial dockets" and usually creates "multiple points of appeal").
Evidence suggests "that the most important goal of a prosecutor is avoiding trial." Id. at 567
n.12.
121. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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B. Lifting the Rule I 1 (b)(3) Veil: The Position of the First, Fifth, and Seventh
Circuits
The First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits do not limit their review on appeal to
the constitutionality of a defendant's guilty plea.' 22  Instead, they lift the
mysterious veil placed over Rule 1 l(b)(3) proceedings by the Fourth, Sixth,
and Eleventh Circuits and independently inquire into the adequacy of the
factual basis.123 Using this approach, the First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits
ascertain the adequacy of the factual basis by actually reviewing it rather than
by reviewing the constitutionality of the plea.
124
In instances where "the record is sufficiently developed," these circuits will
determine a trial court's compliance with Rule 11.125 In so limiting review, the
First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits fail to enforce Rule 11 (g), which requires a
district court to record the proceedings in which a defendant enters his guilty
plea; this recording includes the judge's finding of a factual basis pursuant to
Rule I 1(b)(3).126 A district court has little incentive to record a judge's factual
basis determination when failure to do so renders unreviewable not only
noncompliance with Rule 1 (b)(3), but also other alleged Rule 11 deficiencies
for which a record is needed to review. If a court fails to comply with Rule
1 (g)-one of the Rule 11 requirements that collectively aid a judge in making
a "constitutionally required determination" 127-then the circuit court has a
duty to remand the case to the district court to record its Rule 11 findings
instead of merely glossing over such errors.
The First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits reason that if a district court failed to
satisfy Rule 1 l(b)(3) before entering judgment upon a defendant's
unconditional guilty plea, the purported factual basis is invalid, and the
conviction entered pursuant to it is void. 128 If a conviction is void under these
circumstances, a defendant should be permitted to withdraw his unconditional
guilty plea pursuant to Rule 11(d), which allows a defendant to withdraw an
unconditional guilty plea either "before the court accepts the plea, for any
reason or no reason" or "after the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes
sentence if ... the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the
withdrawal. 129
This position comports with the purposes of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 30 Rather than locking themselves into district courts' errors, these
122. See supra Part I.G.2.
123. See supra Part I.G.2.
124. See supra Part 11.B.
125. United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d 1215, 1219 (1st Cir. 1995).
126. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(g).
127. United States v. McCarthy, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969).
128. See supra Part I.G.2.
129. FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(d).
130. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
2010] 1191
Catholic University Law Review
circuit courts "provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding
... and fairness in administration."' 131 In refusing to blindly adhere to district
courts' findings of factual bases, these circuits remain faithful to Rules
I l(b)(3), 11 (g), and 1 1(h).132
Finally, these circuits hold that even when a defendant expressly waives his
right to appeal, the court retains an automatic right of review because a
defendant's waiver agreement does not waive his substantive right "to be free
of prosecution" for a crime he did not commit.1 33 The Fifth Circuit implicitly
equates a plea agreement that contains a mandatory waiver of a defendant's
right to appeal substantive determinations with an unconscionable, and
therefore unenforceable, contract.'134
C. Cheney's Novel Approach
As discussed above, the Cheney court did not address the issue of whether a
defendant's entrance of an unconditional guilty plea waives his right to appeal
the adequacy of the factual basis for conviction because the defendant,
Holland, explicitly reserved the right to appeal the adequacy of the factual
basis.1 35 Cheney is novel in that Holland effectively employed a conditional
guilty plea to reserve his right to appeal the adequacy of the factual basis-an
issue not normally considered to be of a pretrial nature-without entering a
conditional guilty plea in accordance with the federal rules.
1 36
In Cheney, Holland technically entered an unconditional guilty plea; the plea
did not conform to the Rule 1 (a)(2) requirements for entering conditional
guilty pleas. Still, he reserved his fight to appeal by including a typed
statement in the plea agreement and by stating his reservation on the record
during the plea proceedings. 37  Though Holland entered an unconditional
guilty plea, courts often forgive a defendant's failure to comply with the
131. FED.R.CRIM. P.2.
132. It seems that the Advisory Committee intended for Rule ll(h), the harmless error
provision, to apply to the entirety of Rule 11. See FED. R. CRIM. P. II advisory committee's note.
Although this Comment does not endorse the application of one standard of review over another
with respect to Rule I l(b)(3), it is interesting to note that Rule I l(b)(3) is not excepted from
review under Rule 1 (h). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (h); FED. R. CRIM. P. advisory committee's
note. It is difficult to imagine why the Advisory Committee would make any standard of review
applicable to Rule I1 (b)(3) if Rule I l(b)(3) determinations were unreviewable.
133. United States v. White, 258 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v.
Meacham, 626 F.2d 503, 510 (5th Cir. 1980)); see United States v. McKelvey, 203 F.3d 66, 70
(1st Cir. 2000) (expressing that, when a defendant pleads guilty to conduct that does not satisfy
the statutory elements of the charged offense, his conviction will be reversed).
134. See White, 258 F.3d at 380 (questioning whether the lack of a factual basis is a defect
that "is ever waivable in a civilized system ofjustice"). The unconscionability of a guilty plea is
an issue better pursued under Rule 11 (c)(5), which authorizes a court to reject a plea agreement.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 (c)(5).
135. United States v. Cheney, 571 F.3d 764, 768-69 (8th Cir. 2009).
136. See FED. R. CRIM. P. I l(a)(2); Cheney, 571 F.3d at 768; discussion supra note 59.
137. Cheney, 571 F.3d at 768.
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procedural requirements for entering a conditional guilty plea when "the spirit
of Rule 1 l(a)(2) has been fulfilled [such] that the defendant expressed an
intention to preserve a particular pretrial issue for appeal and that neither the
government nor the district court opposed such a plea."'1 38 Thus, this Comment
will treat Holland's plea as a conditional guilty plea for the purposes of the
ensuing discussion.
Holland's reservation of his right to appeal the court's Rule 1 I(b)(3)
determination is significant. Entering a conditional guilty plea reserves in the
defendant the right to appeal "an adverse determination of a specified pretrial
motion."'1 39  Arguably, however, a Rule 1 l(b)(3) determination is not a
traditional "pretrial motion." 140  Nonetheless, Holland's unique use of the
conditional guilty plea effectively avoided confrontation with the circuit
split. 141
1II. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: USE OF THE CHENEY APPROACH IN THE FOURTH,
SIXTH, AND ELEVENTH CIRCUITS
Three mechanisms exist through which a defendant who entered an
unconditional plea may seek to overturn the conviction on direct appeal by
alleging an inadequate factual basis. First, a defendant can attack the
"intelligent" and "voluntary" nature of the guilty plea.142  Second, in those
circuits which permit it, a defendant may appeal the adequacy of the factual
basis for conviction despite the entrance of an unconditional guilty plea.
143
Third, a defendant could follow the path paved by Cheney by enterin I a
conditional guilty plea and reserving the right to appeal the adequacy issue.
138. United States v. Bell, 966 F.2d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1992).
139. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(a)(2); see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1268 (9th ed. 2009). Such
determinations include a district court's refusal to suppress evidence allegedly seized in violation
of a defendant's constitutional rights. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
140. See discussion supra note 59. Rule I l(a)(2) allows the equivalent of an interlocutory
appeal of a pretrial motion which is adverse to a defendant. The Advisory Committee explained
that Rule I l(a)(2) is intended to apply to the "many defenses, objections and requests which a
defendant must ordinarily raise by pretrial motion." FED. R. CRIM. P. II advisory committee's
note.
141. See supra Part I.F.
142. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. This method is, in fact, the only
recourse a defendant has in the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits. See supra Part II.A.
Pursuant to this theory, defendants could argue that when they entered their pleas, they believed
they were guilty, but subsequently learned that their conduct did not constitute the alleged crimes.
This argument will likely fail, however, due to the standard for determining if a plea was
constitutional. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
143. See supra Part II.B.
144. See supra Part II.C.
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A. The General Approach
Because defendants have no constitutional right to enter a conditional guilty
plea but may do so only "[w]ith the consent of the court and the
government" 145 on a case-by-case basis, a rule of law that consistently allows a
defendant to appeal the adequacy issue would maximize the protection
afforded to defendants. In their review of Rule 1 l(b)(3) determinations, circuit
courts should require district courts to adhere "more meticulously" to Rule
1 (b)(3), thereby effectuating a rule with which district courts otherwise have
little incentive to comply.' 46  Such meticulous adherence to Rule 11
requirements-in particular, compliance with Rule l l(b)(3)-would actually
"discourage, or at least ... enable more expeditious disposition of ... post-
conviction attacks."' 47 Therefore, circuit courts could resolve appeals in a
timely manner because they would have access to fully developed district court
records.
Currently, the circuit split is without a majority position.' 48 Upon the Eighth
Circuit's next confrontation with this issue, though, it should review the district
court's Rule 11(b)(3) determination in accordance with the positions of the
First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits. In so doing, the Eighth Circuit would create
a majority position to which the Supreme Court could turn, should it ever
address this issue.
Until the Supreme Court grants certiorari, defendants in the Fourth, Sixth,
and Eleventh Circuits, as well as those in circuits that have not yet articulated
their positions, may have little recourse. A defendant in one of these circuits
could follow Holland's approach in Cheney by attempting to enter a
conditional guilty plea in accordance with Rule 11 (a)(2) to reserve the right to
appeal the adequacy of the factual basis. 149 As noted above, however, neither
the district court nor the government is obligated to accept a conditional
plea.150 Moreover, conditional guilty pleas have traditionally encompassed
only pretrial motions, and it is questionable whether courts outside of the
Cheney court would recognize a Rule 11(b)(3) determination as a
"determination of a specified pretrial motion."'15' Even if all courts were to
follow Cheney in this regard, not all jurisdictions recognize the validity of
unconditional guilty pleas,' 52 and "neither the courts nor the government have
any duty, either statutory or constitutional, to inform defendants about
conditional pleading."' 153 Because of this, the government has the discretion to
145. FED. R. CRiM. P. 1 I(a)(2); see supra note 65.
146. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969).
147. Id.
148. See supra Part 11.
149. See supra Part II.C.
150. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 I(a)(2); see supra text accompanying note 145.
151. FED. R. CRIM. P. I 1 (a)(2); see supra note 59.
152. See supra note 65.
153. United States v. Fisher, 772 F.2d 371, 375 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
1194 [Vol. 59:1171
Factual Appeals of Unconditional Guilty Pleas
withhold a plea bargain from a defendant unless the defendant agrees to waive
all rights to appeal. 154  This predicament creates a catch-22 for defendants
similar to that which existed before the creation of the conditional guilty plea
in 1983.155
B. Opponents'Arguments Are Without Merit
Adversaries may argue that allowing defendants to appeal Rule 11 (b)(3)
determinations, regardless of whether they entered a conditional or
unconditional guilty plea, will unnecessarily prolong litigation and create an
abundance of appeals and extra expenses for the judicial system. 156 To some
extent, appeals are likely to increase if courts permit Rule I I(b)(3) review.
157
One would anticipate this burden, however, to be minimal. 158 Conversely, if
the circuit split is resolved in favor of the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits,
a defendant will be forced to enter a conditional guilty llea to reserve the right
to appeal the district court's adequacy determination. Moreover, if circuit
courts prohibit conditional guilty pleas, defendants will be forced to choose
154. See FED. R. CRIM. P. I1.
155. See supra Part I.C.
156. United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 54 (4th Cir. 1990) (explaining that the court is
unwilling to permit a defendant who has entered an unconditional guilty plea to appeal his
conviction because doing so would "'eliminate the chief virtues of the plea system-speed,
economy, and finality"' (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977))); Barkai, supra
note 36, at 144 ("Reversal on appeal will create an additional cost resulting from re-pleading or
conducting a trial."); see Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 264-65 (1984) (noting the
importance of the timely adjudication of criminal cases); United States v. Bundy, 392 F.3d 641,
646 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining that even a defendant who reserves the right to appeal by entering
a conditional guilty plea should be permitted only to file appeals relating to a limited number of
issues because of concerns for "judicial economy" and the potential for "'a flood of appellate
litigation"' (quoting United States v. Bums, 684 F.2d 1066, 1072 (2d Cir. 1982))). Similar
concerns arose in the aftermath of Miranda v. Arizona. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
544-45 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (asserting that the "application of the new [Miranda] rule"
will conserve neither "judicial time [nor] effort"). Even in Miranda, a case which developed a
rule with far broader applicability and implications than Cheney, Justice Byron White expressed
skepticism about whetherjudicial economy was a relevant consideration. Id
157. See Barkai, supra note 36, at 127-28 (discussing courts' reluctance "to expand the
factual basis procedure, fearing that it might become a time-consuming, full-blown evidentiary
hearing").
158. Id. at 117 (explaining that the average inquiry concerning the intelligence and
voluntariness of a plea, as well as a Rule 1 l(b)(3) determination "requires about ten minutes").
Thus, the Rule I I(b)(3) determination "should require only one to two minutes at most." Id.
Surely, two minutes is a meager price to pay for increased confidence and legitimacy in the
judicial system. Before the conditional guilty plea was incorporated into the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, states were hesitant to adopt conditional guilty pleas for fear that they would
"flood[] appellate courts." Note, Conditional Guilty Pleas, supra note 18, at 572. A review of
the use of conditional guilty pleas in New York and California revealed that even then "a
relatively small number of additional appeals [were] generated; no 'flooding' of appellate courts
[] resulted." Id.
159. See supra Part II.A.
2010]
Catholic University Law Review
between entering unconditional pleas and pleading not guilty.' 60  Given the
significance of a Rule I l(b)(3) determination, a defendant who doubts the
existence of an adequate factual basis quite conceivably may plead not guilty
and hold the government to its burden of proof. 16 1 By leaving defendants little
choice but to go to trial to reserve the right to appeal Rule 1 1(b)(3)
determinations, this approach essentially robs defendants, prosecutors, and the
judicial system of the substantial benefits the conditional guilty plea was
created to ensure.'62
Adversaries might also argue that review should not be granted because of
the importance of "finality" of district courts' decisions.'6 3  Admittedly,
finality is an important initiative of the criminal-justice system: "[T]he
community [must be able to] repose in its knowledge that justice has been
done, and . . . the offender [must] know that he is unable to avoid his
punishment. ' 64  Nonetheless, the general prevalence of appellate review
demonstrates the judicial system's collective belief that the importance of
finality does not trump that of justice. 65 Regardless, appellate courts tend to
affirm the overwhelming majority of criminal appeals from federal district
courts.
166
Allowing a defendant to appeal the adequacy of the factual basis for
conviction will not necessarily result in fewer convictions; it will merely allow
the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea if the circuit court determines that no
factual basis exists, thereby holding the government to its burden of proof.
167
Assuming a prosecutor would not offer a defendant a plea bargain if the
defendant's conduct did not satisfy the definition of the charged crime, the
government should not be burdened by having to prove its case. Further, a
district court's adherence to the plea-proceeding recording requirements of
160. See supra Part I.C-D.
161. See supra Part II.A.
162. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
163. See Note, Conditional Guilty Pleas, supra note 18, at 573-74 (explaining that for
criminal law to be effective, its punishments must be "final").
164. Id.
165. See id. at 574 (stating that the Supreme Court consistently protects constitutional rights,
"even at the expense of finality"); see 2006 STATISTICS, supra note 4, at tbl.6.3 (explaining that in
fiscal year 2006, federal appellate courts adjudicated approximately 11,764 criminal appeals on
their merits).
166. Id. (showing that 70.7% of criminal cases terminated on their merits were subsequently
affirmed).
167. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; Barkai, supra note 36, at 117 (explaining that reversal on
appeal "does not mean . . . that legally guilty people will be allowed to escape the criminal
sanction. The defendant's case will not be dismissed at the appellate level. The prosecution will
have the opportunity to try the defendant or obtain a new plea"). Upon withdrawing a guilty plea,
a defendant must enter a plea of not guilty or nolo contendere. See FED. R. CRIM. P. I1. If the
defendant fails to enter a plea, the court will enter a default plea of "not guilty." Id. at 1 (a)(4).
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Rule 11 (g), 168 which will be enforced by appellate review of the factual basis
requirement, will facilitate an expedited review.
169
IV. CONCLUSION
Until the Supreme Court resolves the circuit split concerning whether a
defendant's entrance of an unconditional guilty plea waives his right to appeal
the adequacy of the factual basis for conviction, defendants may position
themselves most advantageously by entering conditional guilty pleas. In the
meantime, the Eighth Circuit should join the First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits
to create a majority position to which the Supreme Court might turn, should it
address this issue.
Due to the high volume of guilty pleas entered annually, 70 the judicial
system has a significant and justifiable interest in disposing of its cases
efficiently. Nevertheless, the judicial system must not sacrifice the quality of
its processes for the speed of its administration. 17 1 Allowing a defendant to be
convicted of a crime when his conduct does not satisfy the statutory definition
of that crime cripples our criminal-justice system and our citizens' faith in it.
Not only does it prioritize case disposition over fair administration, but it also
deprives defendants of the fundamental protections they deserve when entering
guilty pleas.' 72 Guilty pleas' central societal role mandates that they maintain
their legitimacy. That legitimacy, however, is undermined when their use
precludes review of whether a defendant's conduct satisfies the statutory
elements of a charged offense. 173 Thus, circuit courts have a duty to review
trial courts' adequacy determinations in the same manner that they review all
other judicial decisions; if a violation is merely formalistic, the applicable
standard of review will likely bar reversal.174 If, on the other hand, the error is
substantive, the maintenance of public "'confidence in the integrity of our
procedures"' and the legitimacy of guilty pleas demand that the justice system
168. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(g).
169. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969) ("[T]he more meticulously
[Rule 11] is adhered to, the more it tends to ... enable more expeditious disposition ... .
170. See supra Part I.A.
171. See Douglas L. Colbert, Connecting Theory and Reality: Teaching Gideon and Indigent
Defendants' Non-Right to Counsel at Bail, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 167, 168 & n.7 (2006)
(explaining the judicial system's interest in reducing "'assembly-line justice,"' a process in which
the criminal-justice system sacrifices the quality of legal services in exchange for efficiency, and
thereby disadvantages criminal misdemeanor defendants (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 36 (1972))).
172. See supra Part I.B.
173. Such a notion certainly does not contribute to society's "'confidence in the integrity of
our procedures."' Timmreck v. United States, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979) (quoting United States v.
Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 528 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
174. See supra note 75. Even though the federal courts do not apply a uniform standard to
their review of Rule 1 l(b)(3) determinations, a district court's mere formalistic error is unlikely to
result in reversal under any of the applicable standards. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (h).
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allow a defendant to plead anew and hold the government to its burden of
proof. 175
175. Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 784 (quoting Smith, 440 F.2d at 528 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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